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FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT-PAROLE RELEASE DETERMINATIONS
Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Nebraska Penal and
Correctional Complex, 99 S. Ct. 2100 (1979).
In Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Nebraska Penal and
Correctional Complex,' the Supreme Court held that
the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment applies to discretionary parole release deter-
minations made by the Nebraska Board of Parole
and that the Board's current procedures meet all
such constitional requirements. Although Greenholtz
marked the first time that the Court applied the
due process clause to parole proceedings, the Court
found no constitutional or inherent right of a con-
victed person to be conditionally released before
the expiration of a valid sentence.2 Instead, the
Court declared that due process protection was
triggered by the Nebraska statutory language
3
which, through its specific requirements, created a
protectible expectation of parole.
I
In 1971, inmates of the Nebraska Penal and
Correctional Complex brought a class action under
section 1983 of Title 424 claiming due process
violations as a result of unconstitutional denials of
parole by the Nebraska Board of Parole. The pro-
1 99 S. Ct. 2100 (1979).
2 Id. at 2104.
3 NEB. REv. STAT. § 83-1,114() (1976) provides:
Whenever the Board of Parole considers the release of a
committed offender who is eligible for release on parole,
it shall order his release unless it is of the opinion that his
release should be deferred because:
(a) There is a substantial risk that he will not
conform to the conditions of parole;
(b) His release would depreciate the seriousness of
his crime or promote disrespect for the law;
(c) His release would have a substantially adverse
effect on institutional discipline; or
(d) His continued correctional treatment, medical
care, or vocational or other training in the
facility will substantially enhance his capacity
to lead a law-abiding life when released at a
later date.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976) provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State
or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States ... to the deprivation of
any rights, privileges or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress.
cedures used by the Board to determine whether
to grant or deny discretionary parole5 are based in
part on statutory requirements and in part on the
Board's practices. The inmates claimed that both
the state statutes and the Board's administrative
procedures denied them procedural due process in
violation of the fourteenth amendment.
The procedures in question provide that at least
once each year from the commencement of each
prisoner's sentence, initial review hearings must be
held for every inmate, regardless of parole eligibil-
ity.6 At the initial review hearing, the Board ex-
amines the inmate's entire preconfinement and
postconfinement record. Following this examina-
tion, an informal hearing is held. No evidence is
formally introduced, but the Board interviews each
inmate and takes under advisement any letters or
statements which the inmate wishes to be consid-
ered along with his claim for relief.
7
If the Board should conclude after this informal
hearing that the inmate is not a good risk for
parole, parole is denied. The inmate is informed of
the reasons for the denial along with any recom-
mendations by the Board to improve his chances
for future release. However, should the Board de-
termine that an inmate demonstrates the proper
characteristics for release, a final hearing is sched-
5 Discretionary parole must be distinguished from
mandatory parole. Mandatory parole is automatic when
an inmate has served his maximum term, less good-time
credits. 99 S. Ct. at 2102. However, an inmate becomes
eligible for discretionary parole when the minimum term,
less good-time credits has been served. Id. Only discre-
tionary parole is relevant to the Greenholtz case.
6 This requirement is found in NEa. REv. STAT. § 83-
192(9) (1976), which provides that the Board of Parole
shall:
Review the record of every committed offender,
whether or not eligible for parole, not less than once
each year. Such review shall include the circum-
stances of the offender's offense, the presentence
investigation report, his previous social history and
criminal record, his conduct, employment, and at-
titude during commitment, and the reports of such
physical and mental examinations as have been
made. The board shall meet with such offender and
counsel him concerning his progress and prospects
for future parole....
799 S. Ct. at 2102.
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uled. This hearing provides its own peculiar amal-
gam of procedural protections which can be sum-
marized as follows. First, the Board notifies each
inmate of the month in which the final hearing
will be held. Notification of the exact day and time
is not provided to each candidate until the day of
the hearing when this information is posted on a
bulletin board which is accessible to all inmates.
Secondly, although not permitted to hear adverse
testimony or to cross-examine adverse witnesses,
each inmate may present evidence, call witnesses,
and be represented by private counsel of his
choice.8 Furthermore, a complete tape recording of
the hearing is preserved. And finally, if parole is
denied by the Board upon conclusion of this hear-
ing, the Board must provide a written statement of
the reasons for the denial within thirty days.9
In its order and memorandum opinion of Octo-
ber 21, 1977, the district court held that the pro-
cedures used by the Nebraska Parole Board did
not satisfy due process. The court ordered that
"[e]very inmate eligible for parole under Nebraska
law must be afforded a formal parole hearing."'
1
The district court also concluded that to meet
minimum due process requirements, the Board
must provide at least seventy-two hour notice to
each inmate of the exact date and time of the
hearing along with a concise list of all factors which
the Board may consider in evaluating an inmate
for discretionary parole." Each inmate also must
be permitted to appear in person before the Board
to present evidence unless prison security consid-
erations would warrant otherwise. 2 However, the
court did not provide inmates with the right to
confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses. The
81d. Counsel must be provided for by the inmate
himself and indigent prisoners are not entitled to ap-
pointed counsel.
9 This provision is also found in NEB. REv. STAT. § 83-
1,111(2) (1976),
The board shall render its decision regarding the
committed offender's release on parole within a
reasonable time after the hearing. The decision shall
be by majority vote of the board. The decision shall
be based on the entire record before the board,
which shall include the opinion of the member who
presided at the hearing. If the board shall deny
parole, written notification listing the reasons for
such denial and the recommendations for correcting
deficiencies which cause the denial shall be given to
the committed offender within thirty days following
the hearing.
10 Inmates of Neb. Penal & Correctional Complex v.
Greenholtz, 576 F.2d 1274, 1283 (8th Cir. 1978). The
district court opinion was unpublished.
1Id.
12 id.
court required that a record of the parole proceed-
ings be maintained.'3 Finally, the district court
held that not only must the Board provide an
inmate reasons for the denial of parole within a
reasonable time, but the Board must also supply
the inmate a full and fair written explanation of
the evidence upon which it relied in arriving at this
decision.'
4
The court of appeals affirmed in part and re-
versed in part providing modifications to the dis-
trict court's pronouncements.' 5 The court held that
a prisoner in Nelbraska has a statutory right to fair
parole consideration and thus is entitled to the
protection of the due process clause. In balancing
"the interests of the inmates in their statutorily
granted expectation of meaningful consideration
for parole and the interests of the state and society
in the orderly administration of the parole sys-
tem," 6 the court found that a formal parole hear-
ing was mandatory only when the inmate first
became eligible for parole. Subsequent formal
hearings were to be permitted only at the discretion
of the Nebraska Parole Board.
Agreeing with the district court, the court of
appeals determined that seventy-two hour notice
of the exact time and date of the hearing was
necessary to insure the inmate's adequate prepa-
ration. The court also decided that a list of criteria
governing the Board's decisions should be provided
to each inmate.17 Furthermore, the court proposed
that a list of statutory criteria and guidelines used
by the Board should be posted in a place which is
accessible to all inmates. Again affirming the dis-
trict court, the court of appeals held that inmates
are entitled to appear before the Board and present
evidence but are not entitled to confront and cross-
examine adverse witnesses. The court similarly
agreed that a record of the parole proceedings must
be maintained, but concluded that the tape record-
ings presently retained by the Board were sufficient
to meet constitutional requirements.
Finally, the appellate court agreed that when
the Board denied parole to an inmate, a full expla-
nation of the evidence relied upon, not just the
reasons for denial, must be provided.'8 In the opin-
ion of the court, this additional information would
facilitate judicial review by compelling all Board
members to consider all relevant points in each
'
3 Id at 1284.
14 Id.
's Id. at 1277.
1
6 Id. at 1282.
'
7 Id. at 1283.
1
8 Id. at 1284.
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individual case. Such comprehensive analysis
would foster rehabilitation by instructing inmates
on how to improve their chances for parole release
and would promote consistency in parole release
determinations by encouraging the development of
a body of rules, principles, and precedent that
present and future Board members could follow in
their decisionmaking.' 9
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to deter-
mine whether due process requirements apply to
parole release proceedings, and if they apply, ex-
actly what procedural requirements are
necessary."2 In deciding whether due process con-
siderations are applicable, the majority, 2 1 in an
opinion by Chief Justice Burger, concluded that
prison inmates have no constitutional or inherent
right to be conditionally released prior to the ex-
piration of their sentences.Y States are permitted
to establish parole systems but are under no con-
stitutional duty to do so. Thus, the decision
whether or not to release an inmate prior to the
completion of the sentence raises no constitutional
implications.
The Court, in a methodical opinion, presented
and answered each of the inmates' claims for due
process protection. Relying on Morrissey v. Brewer,2
where the Court held that due process applied to
parole revocation proceedings, respondent-inmates
equated parole release and parole revocation and
determined that the interest at stake underlying
both of them was conditional liberty and thus, they
should be accorded the same constitutional protec-
tion as accorded a parole revokee. The Court re-
fused to adopt this reasoning, instead holding that
"Itihere is a crucial distinction between being de-
prived of a liberty one has, as in parole, and being
denied a conditional liberty that one desires."
24
The Court also found differences in the nature
of the decision to be made in each case. It found
the decision to revoke parole is based on the wholly
retrospective factual question of whether the par-
olee in fact acted in violation of parole conditions.
The Court determined that the parole release de-
cision, however,
is more subtle and depends on an amalgam of
elements, some of which are factual but many of
Id. at 1284-85.
2099 S. Ct. at 2102.
21 The majority included Chief Justice Burger and
Justices Blackmun, Stewart, Rehnquist, and White.
2299 S. Ct. at 2104.
" 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
2499 S. Ct. at 2105.
which are purely subjective appraisals by the board
members based upon their experience with the dif-
ficult and sensitive task of evaluating the advisability
of parole release. Unlike the revocation decision,
there is no set of facts which, if shown, mandate a
decision favorable to the individual.2r
Agreeing with the respondents' contention that
the Nebraska statutory language created a protec-
tible expectation of parole,26 the Court in turn
found a legitimate expectation of release absent
one of the statutory justifications for deferral. How-
ever, the Court emphasized that the relevant Ne-
braska statutory provision had a unique structure
and language and thus the determination of
whether due process entitlements are created by
the statutes of other states must be made on a case-
by-case basis.2 7
The Court then turned to a determination of
whether the additional procedures mandated by
the court of appeals were necessary. Answering this
question in the negative, the majority held that a
formal hearing for every inmate would provide "at
best a negligible decrease in the risk of errors.
' ss
The Court found that the inmates' opportunity to
appear at the Board's initial hearing and present
evidence in their own behalf adequately insured
against serious errors and thus satisfied due process.
The Court further held that due process did not
require that the Board specify the evidence on
which it rested its determination to deny release.2
Fearful that such a requirement would trahsform
the informal parole hearing into a full adversarial
proceeding, the Court determined that the Consti-
tution requires no more than that the Board must
inform the inmate of the reasons for denial of
parole.
Finally, the Court found that the Board's written
notice in advance of the month during which the
hearing would be held was constitutionally ade-
quate.2 0 This notice provided an ample opportu-
nity for each inmate to secure any letters or state-
ments that he wished to present at the hearing.
Furthermore, no claim was made that the timing
of the notice prejudiced the inmate's ability to
prepare for the hearing. Thus, the majority re-
versed the holdings of the lower courts by deter-
mining that the Nebraska Parole Board's proce-
• id.
26 See note 3 supra for text of statutory provision.
2799 S. Ct. at 2106.
2Id. at 2107.
2"Id. at 2108.
30Id. at 2107 n.6.
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dural protections satisfied the minimum require-
ments of due process.
Justice Powell, concurring in part and dissenting
in part, agreed with the Court that respondents
had a right to due process in the consideration of
their release on parole. However, he concluded that
due process protections did not depend on the
Nebraska statutory language but instead arose out
of the presence of the parole system itself.*t By
adopting a parole system, the state created a jus-
tifiable expectation among the inmates that parole
will be granted whenever the standards of eligibil-
ity are met. Furthermore, Justice Powell dismissed
the majority's distinction between parole release
and revocation.
Release on parole marks the first time when the
severe restrictions imposed on a prisoner's liberty by
the prison regimen may be lifted, and his behavior
in prison is often molded by his hope and expectation
of securing parole at the earliest time permitted by
law. Thus, the parole release determination may be
as important to the prisoner as some later, and
generally unanticipated, parole revocation deci-
sion.
3 2
Justice Powell also refused to accept the distinction
between the nature of decisionmaking in parole
release and revocation. Finding that the parole
release decision, like the parole revocation decision,
is based on retrospective factual findings of prisoner
behavior, he found the release determination no
more subjective than the parole revocation deci-
sion.
In his opinion, Justice Powell agreed with the
majority that a formal hearing was not required
for every inmate and that every parole denial need
not include a statement of evidence relied on by
the Board. However, he determined that the pres-
ent notice afforded to inmates scheduled for final
hearings was constitutionally inadequate.33 In con-
cluding that at least three days' notice before a
final hearing was constitutionally mandated, Pow-
ell explained that any less protection would nullify
any possibility that the inmate could be reviewed
fairly and in accordance with due process.
The dissent, written by Justice Marshall and
joined in by Justices Brennan and Stevens, con-
curred with Justice Powell's conclusion that all
prisoners of states which have created parole sys-
tems have a liberty interest of which they may not




be deprived without due process, regardless of the
specificity of the relevant parole statutes.a4 Reli-
ance on government statisticsa and experience in
the federal judicial system provides inmates with a
legitimate expectation of release whenever a parole
system is established.
In agreement with Justice Powell, the dissenters
found that any possible distinction between parole
revocation and release did not merit constitutional
inquiry. The dissenters dismissed the use of differ-
ential treatment between a freedom currently en-
joyed and one that is rightfully anticipated, citing
Wolff v. McDonnell,3 6 and noted that in other con-
texts the Court has held that due process protects
those liberty interests which are not currently en-
joyed by individuals.3 7 In similar fashion, the dis-
sent explained that the nature of the decision in
parole release and revocation proceedings is
equally subjective.38
In voting to modify the Nebraska Parole Board's
procedural requirements, the dissenters would have
held that the current practice of informal and
formal hearings is constitutionally sufficient.s
'Id. at 2111 (Marshall, Brennan, and Stevens, JJ.,
dissenting in part).
5 NAT'L COUNCIL ON CRIME AND DELINQUENCY, UNI-
FORM PAROLE REPORTS, PAROLE IN THE UNITED STATES:
1976 AND 1977, at 55 (1978), cited in 99 S. Ct. at 2115
n.10(Marshall, Brennan, and Stevens, JJ., dissenting
in part)[hereinafter cited as UNIFORM PAROLE
REPORTS]. Recent studies show that parole is the method
of release for approximately 70 percent of all criminal
offenders returned each year to the community.
-6418 U.S. 539 (1974). In Wo/ff, the Supreme Court
held that the due process clause entities a state prisoner
to certain procedural protections when he is deprived of
good-time credits because of serious misconduct. This
deprivation results in a forfeiture of freedom at some time
in the future and is an example of procedural protections
for a loss of liberty not currently enjoyed.
3799 S. Ct. at 2113 (Marshall, Brennan, and Stevens,
JJ., dissenting in part). In support of this statement the
dissenters cited Willner v. Committee on Character &
Fitness, 373 U.S. 96 (1963); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S.
513 (1958); Konigsberg v. State Bar, 353 U.S. 252 (1957);
Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957);
Simmons v. United States, 348 U.S. 397 (1955); Gold-
smith v. Board of Tax Appeals, 270 U.S. 117 (1926). 99
S. Ct. at 2113 n.6 (Marshall, Brennan, and Stevens, JJ.,
dissenting in part).
'1 The dissent relied on Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S.
471, 479-80 (1972), where Chief Justice Burger and the
majority had concluded that the revocation decision
involves a two-step process. The first step involves the
wholly retrospective factual question, but the second step
involves a prediction by the Board members as to the
ability of the inmate to return to society without com-
mitting antisocial acts.
9 99 S. Ct. at 2119 (Marshall, Brennan, and Stevens,
JJ., dissenting in part).
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However, emphasizing that adequate notice is a
fundamental requirement of due process,40 the dis-
sent found that the Board's notification is inade-
quate. Similarly, the dissenters concluded that the
inmates are entitled to a statement of the crucial
evidence on which the Board relies in denying




In order to understand the importance of the
Greenholtz decision, a brief history of the inconsist-
encies and contradictions found in the circuit court
decisions regarding parole release prior to Greenholtz
is helpful. In Menechino v. Oswald,43 the Second
Circuit held that a prison inmate was not entitled
to procedural due process when considered by the
New York State Board of Parole for parole release.
Concluding that since some of the essential condi-
tions for requiring procedural due process as a
matter of constitutional right are missing in this
instance,"4 the court found that the administrative
burden of providing these requirements would be
enormous and incapacitating.
Similarly, in Scarpa v. United States Board of Pa-
role,45 the Fifth Circuit held that due process rights
do not attach to parole board proceedings concern-
ing the grant or denial of parole to prisoners.46 In
refusing to accept that the loss involved in a denial
of parole is equal to that involved in parole revo-
cation, the court explained that when the Board
refused to grant parole the inmate suffers no dep-
rivation since in reality, he serves no more time
than the sentence originally imposed by the court.4 7
"°Id. (citing Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v.
Craft, 436 U.S. 1 (1976)); Mullane v. Central Hanover
Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950)).
41 Id. at 2120.
42 Id. at 2120-21; see text accompanying note 19 supra.
4 430 F.2d 403 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S.
1023 (1971).
44 Among these missing conditions are lack of an ad-
versarial proceeding since the Board has an interest in
fostering each inmate's rehabilitation, and absence of an
interest which is currently enjoyed by the inmate.
45 477 F.2d 278 (5th Cir.), vacated as moot, 414 U.S. 809
(1973).
4 This decision was to be expected in light of the
earlier decision of Thompkins v. United States Bd. of
Parole, 427 F.2d 222 (5th Cir. 1970), which held that a
federal prisoner was not entitled to parole as a matter of
right on meeting conditions prescribed by statutes allow-
ing parole to be granted when the prisoner has served
one-third of his sentence.
47 477 F.2d at 282.
Continuing this trend in the Fifth Circuit, Brown v.
Lundgren4' held that the mere expectation of parole
release by an inmate is not so vested as to result in
a "grievous loss" ' 49 if denied by the Parole Board;
thus, the court would not consider whether the
parole board procedures violated due process.
The courts of the Second, Fourth, Seventh, and
District of Columbia Circuits have taken the op-
posing view and held that some due process re-
quirements are mandatory in parole release deci-
sions. However, even in these circuits, the rationales
and modicums of protection afforded prisoners
were at variance prior to the Supreme Court deci-
sion in Greenholtz. In the Second Circuit case of
United States ex rel. Johnson v. Chairman of New York
State Board of Parole,° the court held that due
process requires that an inmate who had been
denied parole be given a statement of reasons for
the denial which would be sufficient to enable a
reviewing body to determine whether parole had
been denied for an impermissible reason or for no
reason at all and which would furnish the inmate
both the grounds for the decision and the essential
facts upon which the Parole Board's inferences
were based. While distinguising the Menechino
case,' the court found that the protection of one
due process weapon, a statement of reasons, is
crucial to fundamental fairness and spares each
inmate from the "inhumanity of ignorance"5 2 of
the reasons for which parole was denied.
Likewise in Childs v. United States Board of Parole,sa
the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
held that due process requires that applicants for
parole be given a written statement of the reasons
for denial of parole. Quoting heavily from both
4 528 F.2d 1050 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 917
(1976).
49 528 F.2d at 1053. The court found that the threshold
question to be answered regarding whether due process
is required, is whether there is a "grievous loss" of a
liberty or property interest. When the court finds no such
loss, as here, the second question of whether the particular
challenged procedure complies with fundamental fairness
is never reached. Id.
50 500 F.2d 925 (2d Cir.), vacated as moot, 419 U.S. 1015
(1974).
51 See text accompanying note 43 supra. Menechino held
that an inmate being considered for parole release was
not entitled to the full panoply of due process rights; no
decision was rendered on whether a simple statement of
reasons for denial alone would be unconstitutional. 403
F.2d at 412.
52 500 F.2d at 933.
3511 F.2d 1270 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
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Morrissey v. Brewer and Wolff v. McDonnellss the
court found that as a result of the Parole Board's
discretion, the inmate suffers a "grievous loss" or
gains a conditional liberty. Accordingly, the in-
mate's interest is substantial and should be guided
by minimal standards of due process of law.
A similar decision was reached by the Fourth
Circuit in Bradford v. Weinstein, which held that
due process did apply to parole release proceedings.
Unsure and unwilling to determine what process
was "due," the court admitted that due process
was a flexible concept and even if applicable does
not carry with it a fixed panoply of rights or a fixed
mode of procedure.
57
The Seventh Circuit presented its minimum def-
inition of due process in United States ex rel. Richerson
v. Wolff, where the court held that reasons for
denial of parole release must be given by the Illinois
Parole Board.59 Also, in Franklin v. Shields,' the
Fourth Circuit held that due process requires the
Board to furnish a written statement to the inmate
of its reasons for denying parole. Relying on a
statutory right to fair parole consideration, the
court found that an arbitrary denial of parole to a
prisoner who satisfies all the requirements for
release is indeed a grievous loss.6 1 Furthermore, it
is impossible for a court to ascertain whether refusal
to grant parole release was arbitrary when the
Board is not required to provide reasons for its
denial.
These cases demonstrate an obvious confusion in
the circuits regarding whether due process require-
ments apply to parole release proceedings. Even
those courts which had determined that due proc-
ess protections were applicable were reluctant to
provide anything more than minimal protections
(e.g., a statement of reasons).
Yet until the Greenholtz decision, the Supreme
5 408 U.S. 471 (1972), where the Supreme Court held
that parole revocation proceedings were subject to due
process requirements.
418 U.S. 539 (1974); see note 36 supra.
s6 519 F.2d 728 (4th Cir. 1974), vacatedas moot, 423 U.S.
147 (1975).
57519 F.2d at 733.
5 525 F.2d 797 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S.
914 (1976).
"' The court also concluded that the Board's statement
that parole was being denied because to grant it would
depreciate the seriousness of the offense was sufficient to
satisfy minimum due process requirements. 525 F.2d at
804.
605 69 F.2d 784 (4th Cir. 1977), ceri. denied, 435 U.S.
1003 (1978).
61 569 F.2d at 791.
Court had never granted certiorari in a case which
would determine whether due process requirements
apply to parole release proceedings. However, the
Court had answered this question in the related
fields of parole revocation and prisoner disciplinary
proceedings. In Morrissey v. Brewer,62 the Supreme
Court carefully developed a list of due process
protections required in all parole revocation hear-
ings. Finding that the due process clause mandated
certain protections in each revocation proceeding
regardless of the explicit statutory language, the




a) written notice of the claimed violations of parole;
b) disclosure to the parolee of evidence against him;
c) opportunity to be heard in person and to present
witnesses and documentary evidence; d) the right to
confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses... ; e)
a "neutral and detached" hearing body such as a
traditional parole board, members of which need
not be judicial officers or lawyers; and f) a written
statement by the factfinders as to the evidence relied
on and reasons for revoking parole.r'
In Wolff v. McDonnell,6s the Supreme Court
threw additional light on due process requirements
for proceedings involving prisoners. This case in-
volved the validity of procedures applied by state
prison authorities in serious disciplinary proceed-
ings which might result in the loss of good-conduct
time. The Court, in an opinion by Justice White,
emphasized that prisoners do not lose their consti-
tutional rights by virtue of their confinement.
6
The Court stated that "[tihere is no iron curtain
drawn between the Constitution and the prisoners
of this country."67 Although deciding that the dep-
rivation of good time was not the same immediate
disaster for the prisoner that the revocation of
parole is for the paroleer a the Court nonetheless
extended two of the Morrissey procedural protec-
tions to prison disciplinary proceedings in order to
fulfill what it saw as minimum due process require-
1"2 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
'Id. at 489.
' Following the decision in Morrissey, in Gagnon v.
Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973), the Court held that re-
quirements of due process established for parole revoca-
tion were applicable to probation revocation proceedings
and even included the right to counsel where probationer
makes a request and when specified criteria are met.
65418 U.S. 539 (1974).




ments. Therefore, the Court in Wolff required ad-
vance written notice of the claimed violation and
a written statement by the factfinders as to the
evidence upon which they relied and the reasons
for the diciplinary action taken.69
In 1976, the Supreme Court decided two more
disciplinary action cases in Meachum v. Fano70 and
Montanye v. Haymes.7' These decisions were based on
the Court's findings that the prisoners had no right
to remain at any particular prison facility and had
no justifiable expectation that they would not be
transferred unless found guilty of misconduct.
These cases can easily be distinguished from Green-
holtz for, unlike the protections provided by Ne-
braska law, neither Massachusetts law in Meachum
nor New York law in Montanye conferred any right
on the prisoner to remain in the prison to which he
was initially assigned.
III
Although Greenholtz seemingly puts an end to the
confusion in the circuits, many of the distinctions
the Court made are incapable of enduring careful
scrutiny and analysis. The first area of concern is
the Court's significant differentiation between pa-
role release and revocation. Not all of the protec-
tions provided to inmates in parole revocation
proceedings have been applied to parole release by
the Greenholtz decision. Most notably missing are
the right to confront and cross-examine adverse
witnesses and the right to receive a written state-
ment of the evidence relied on for denying parole. 7
Yet the Greenholtz Court rationalizes this differen-
tial treatment through the dissimilarity it found
between parole release and revocation.
First, the Greenholtz majority found a crucial
difference between being deprived of a liberty one
has, as in parole revocation, and being denied a
conditional liberty that one desires, as in parole
release.73 However, the notion that the prisoner,
9 Id. at 564.
'0427 U.S. 215 (1976). Due process was held not to
entitle a state prisoner to a factfinding hearing when he
is transferred to a prison, the conditions of which are
substantially less favorable to him, absent a state law or
practice conditioning such transfers on proof of serious
misconduct or the occurrence of other specified events.
7' 427 U.S. 236 (1976). The Court held, per Justice
White, that the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment did not require a hearing in connection with
the transfer of a state prisoner to another institution,
where under state law the prisoner had no right to remain
at any particular prison.
7' See text accompanying note 63 supra.
73 See text accompanying note 24 supra.
unlike the parolee, has no present interest in his
liberty bears little relation to reality. It is difficult
to see why a movement from imprisonment to
conditional liberty on parole is any less dramatic
a change in status than a movement in the reverse
direction. The stakes are equally high in both
situations. If parole is revoked, the parolee is re-
turned to prison and often receives no credit for his
time served on parole.74 However, in the parole
release decision, the inmate's conditional liberty is
also at stake and the consequences of rejection are
all the deprivations and penalties of our penal
institutions.75 It is difficult to comprehend how
either of these two "grievous losses" can be so easily
distinguished by the Greenholtz Court.
Similarly, the Greenholtz majority differentiates
between the high degree of discretion involved in
a parole release decision and the absence of this
discretion in parole revocation proceedings. 76 How-
ever, as the dissenters in Greenholtz emphasize, 7 the
parole revocation determination is not as factual
as it first appears. As explained in Morrissey, once
a parole violation is recognized, it is up to the
Parole Board members in the exercise of their
discretion to determine whether the violations are
evidence of the parolee's incapacity to live in soci-
ety without committing antisocial acts. 7 Thus,
either decision is replete with the discretion of the
members of the Parole Board and sharply calls into
question the validity of the Court's theory.
In addition, the Nebraska notice requirement as
affirmed by the Greenholtz Court is insufficient.
Although summarily dismissed by the majority in
a footnote, 79 the Greenholtz dissenters pose grave
constitutional questions as to the requirement's
legitimacy. Noting that the receipt of adequate
notice is one of the fundamental prerequisites of
due process,8 the dissenters found that the lack of
notification, prior to the day of the hearing, of the
exact date and time violated due process standards.
The Board currently informs inmates only that it
will conduct an initial review or final parole hear-
ing during a particular month within the current
year.8 ' This indefinite notice forces an inmate to
74 Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480 (1972).
'5 Note, Curbing Abuse in the Decision to Grant or Deny
Parole, 8 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 419, 448 (1973).
76 See text accompanying note 25 supra.
7 See note 38 supra.
78 408 U.S. at 480.
9 See note 30 and accompanying text supra.
"o 99 S. Ct. at 2119 (Marshall, Brennan, and Stevens,




be fully prepared to present his case on each day of
the specified month. Such a requirement is unnec-
essary and frustrating to all inmates and surely
does not conform to the fundamental fairness cri-
teria of due process. The seventy-two hour notice
prescribed by the dissenters and court of appeals
would alleviate much of this stress without greatly
adding to the administrative burden of the Parole
Board.
Finally, the Court's requirement of explicit stat-
utory language to trigger due process protection in
parole release proceedings sorely undercuts the im-
portance of the opinion itself. The Court found
that no expectation of liberty arises out of the
state's actual creation of a parole system. Although
it is true that a state is under no obligation to
establish a parole system,r 8 2 once such a system is
established, a presumption of future liberty prior
to the completion of an inmate's sentence is real-
istically created. Statistics show that the practice
of releasing prisoners on parole before the end of
their sentences has become an integral part of the
pen system.8 3 Therefore, it is not surprising to
suspect that once prisoners are incarcerated, their
expectation is that they will be released at a time
prior to the expiration of their actual sentences.
Thus, due process protections should arise from the
parole system itself without the need for explicit
statutory language. The denial of parole without
proper procedural requirements is a deprivation of
d liberty interest.
Hence, after completing an analysis of the Green-
holtz decision and its inadequacies, one is drawn to
the conclusion that in order to provide adequate
procedural protections, the safeguards accorded
parole revocation by the Morrissey opinion should
be applied in all parole release proceedings. The
distinctions between parole release and revocation
made by the Supreme Court do not adequately
82 99 S. Ct. at 2104.
83 See id. at 2115 n.10 (Marshall, Brennan, and Stevens,
JJ., dissenting in part). These statistics prior to 1976 are
similarly conclusive.
1965 ... 60.4% 1966 .. 59.9% 1967 ... 61.3%
1968 _ 61.6% 1969 ... 62.9% 1970 ... 62.4%
1971 ... 64.4% 1972 ... 66.0% 1973 ... 68.0%
1974 ... 67.0% 1975 ... 68.3%
UNIFORM PAROLE REPORTS, supra note 35, at 55-56.
reflect the realities of the situation. The inmate,
whose freedom or continued incarceration lies in
the hands of the Parole Board, is at least entitled
to all the procedural protections accorded in Mor-
rissey so that he can fully present his case and thus
enable the Board to make the fairest and most
informed decision possible.
CONCLUSION
In Greenholtz, the Supreme Court finally pre-
sented an assertive statement about the due process
requirements of parole release proceedings. How-
ever, although the decision appears to give pris-
oners specifically defined constitutional protec-
tions, the case is capable of being interpreted in a
very narrow fashion. Although the Court found
that due process applies to Nebraska parole release
proceedings, it found the requisite liberty interest
in the explicit language of the Nebraska statute
and not implicit in the nature of the parole system
itself. Thus in future cases, courts can still refuse to
apply due process protections where no parole
statutes exist or where the statutory language does
not create the liberty interest.
The procedural rights granted by the Court to
prisoners in parole release proceedings also can be
narrowly construed. Now that minimum due proc-
ess standards have been established, parole boards
must provide inmates with only those protections
prescribed in Greenholtz even if different factual
situations, in the interest of fairness, justify addi-
tional safeguards.
The Greenholtz decision, thus, is a curious com-
posite of the dual concerns of keeping a convicted
offender in prison and recognition of the impor-
tance of an individual's liberty interest in due
process.' The Court, in attempting to pacify both
sides, instead formulated a decision which will
satisfy few supporters of either position. As the case
stands today, all Greenholtz indicates is that in some
situations, parole release proceedings must meet
certain minimum due process requirements. Only
future litigation on this issue will demonstrate just
how far the Court is willing to go to protect prison
inmates from arbitrary denials of warranted parole.
' See generally Parsons-Lewis, Due Process in Parole-
Release Decisions, 60 CALIF. L. REv. 1518 (1972).
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